Anne Alexander, "Mobilization from above, mobilization from below: the Suez crisis and the national movement in Egypt and Iraq"

In the West, the events of the Suez crisis – the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the Israeli, British and French invasion of Egypt and subsequent withdrawal – were bound up with the image of the Egyptian leader Gamal ‘Abd-al-Nasir. For his opponents he was a ‘Hitler on the Nile’, a dictator and autocrat of the worst type, expressing the basest instincts of the mob. To many others he was a hero, the personification of the anti-colonial revolution, and the voice of the oppressed Arab masses.

What is often forgotten, however, is the extent to which the Suez crisis marked a transformation in ‘Abd-al-Nasir’s image within the Arab world. Only two years previously, he had been attacked by the Left for his suppression of the Communists and the independent trade union movement and faced protests from Islamists over the crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had broken with ‘Abd-al-Nasir over the negotiations to evacuate British troops from Egypt, ending in an agreement some thought conceded too much to the occupying forces. In addition, many anti-imperialist activists felt that the Free Officers’ regime was suspiciously friendly towards the USA.

After World War Two both Egypt and Iraq had experienced a period of mass mobilizations against British imperialism and the local pro-British ruling class. The national movements at this stage were broad-based coalitions of different opposition groups, including trade unions, left-wing nationalist groups, Communist parties, student organizations and peasant groups. Their challenge to imperialism was also a challenge to the existing political order. The seizure of power in Egypt in the name of the national movement by a group of young army officers in July 1952 fundamentally changed this relationship. In place of anti-imperialist mobilization from below, the Free Officers’ leader Gamal ‘Abd-al-Nasir fought to incorporate national movement into the state. This brought him into conflict with the Communists, other opposition parties and the independent trade unions, who initially bitterly opposed the loss of their autonomy, playing a leading role in strikes and demonstrations against ‘Abd-al-Nasir in March 1954. Yet in 1956, these same activists rallied to ‘Abd-al-Nasir, providing the backbone of the popular resistance to the Anglo-French invasion.

This paper examines this contradiction, arguing that the adoption of ‘Abd-al-Nasir as a symbol of the anti-colonial movement marked the consolidation of a deeper transformation: the substitution of mobilization from above for mobilization from below. I will compare the impact of the Suez crisis on the national movement in Egypt (where the state had become the main focus of resistance to imperialism) to Iraq (where the state remained pro-British with a broad anti-imperialist movement mobilized against it).