Susan Williams, "When Britain Backed Apartheid: Seretse Khama and the Harragin Inquiry of 1949".
Paper presented at the New Socialist Approaches to History seminar, Institute of Historical Research, November 13th 2006
The Commonwealth historian David Goldsworthy has described the exile of Seretse Khama (1950-56) as the ‘first major confrontation of Britain’s liberal policy with southern African white racialism’. But there was no such confrontation: overwhelmingly, the British colonial government chose to collude with the apartheid governments of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. There was a confrontation – but it was against the people of Botswana (then the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland).
This paper looks at an early stage in this confrontation: the Harragin Inquiry of November 1949. The stated aim of the Inquiry – presided over by Sir Walter Harragin, Chief Justice of the High Commission Territories – was to determine whether Seretse Khama was ‘a fit and proper person to discharge the functions of Chief’. However, the Bangwato had already established beyond any doubt – at a massive Kgotla in Serowe, just five months before – that they regarded Seretse as their rightful Kgosi. The real purpose of the Inquiry was to buy time for the British government, which did not want to recognise Seretse.
Almost as soon as preparations began, the Inquiry developed into something more than simply a means of buying time: it became an expedient to establish that Seretse Khama was not ‘a fit and proper person to be Chief’. Sir Evelyn Baring, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, marshalled his staff in Bechuanaland to deliver this result. ‘It is clear,’ he instructed firmly, ‘that the Administration per se must exert every effort to ensure that the weight of the evidence placed before the enquiry is against Seretse.’
This paper will examine the tactics used by Baring to stack the evidence against Seretse, with the assistance of other vested interests, including the South African government and the London Missionary Society.
However, Baring did not bargain for the success of the arguments put forward by Seretse Khama and his supporters, which led Harragin to conclude that Seretse was unquestionably fit to be Chief. Nor did Baring realise that Harragin – a maverick figure – would resist the pressure put on him to deliver a particular result. The final Report gave the ‘right’ answer, but for the ‘wrong’ reason – that Seretse should not be installed as Kgosi, but only because his marriage was unacceptable to the governments of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. This conclusion was seen as ‘explosive’ and so the Report – now a liability to the British government – was kept secret.
Finally, this paper will consider the extent to which the Harragin Inquiry can be seen as a dress rehearsal for the trial of Jomo Kenyatta at Kapenguria, in 1952, when he was charged with being the leader of the Mau Mau. As in the case of the Harragin Inquiry three years before, Baring – who was now Governor of Kenya – was a key instigator of the trial and, despite a very weak and incoherent case, was determined to influence its outcome. But he was mindful of the pitfalls of the Harragin Inquiry and had learnt his lesson. This time, he was more careful to control every single aspect of the process. And this time, he was successful: Kenyatta was convicted.